Duquesne Law Review
Volume 9

Number 1

Article 19

1970

Domestic Relations - Antenuptial Agreement - Void Marriage
Thomas M. Schultz

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas M. Schultz, Domestic Relations - Antenuptial Agreement - Void Marriage, 9 Duq. L. Rev. 135
(1970).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol9/iss1/19

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Recent Decisions

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ANTENUPTIAL

AGREEMENT-VOID

MARRIAGE-

The New York Court of Appeals held that an antenuptial agreement
subject to an express condition that the marriage be solemnized was
enforceable where the subsequent marriage was declared void because
it was within the prohibited degrees of relationship.
In Re Estate of Simms, 26 N.Y.2d 163, 309 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1970).
The petitioner and her uncle by the half-blood, the testator, executed an
agreement in contemplation of marriage. By the agreement, the petitioner waived her right of election in the testator's estate and he was
to bequeath to her $25,000 in his will. In addition, the agreement stated
that it would become effective "only in the event that the contemplated
marriage between the parties shall be solemnized."' The petitioner and
the testator subsequently married in New York, but approximately one
year thereafter the decedent obtained a judgment declaring the marriage null and void as incestuous. 2
The Surrogate's Court of King's County adjudged the claim on the
agreement to be a valid one. The supreme court, appellate division,
reversed. 3 On appeal, the court of appeals reinstated the decision of the
4

surrogate.
The issue before the court was whether an antenuptial contract subject to a condition that the marriage be solemnized was enforceable
where the subsequent marriage was declared void because it was within
the prohibited degrees of relationship of uncle and neice.6 In answering
this question in the affirmative, the court found that the contract was
not unlawful. Judge Bergan, 6 speaking for the majority, relied on a
ruling in In re Estate of May.7 There the court of appeals held that a
marriage between uncle and neice, though prohibited in New York,
could have been entered into validly in some other jurisdiction and
1. In Re Estate of Simms, 26 N.Y.2d 163, -, 309 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1970).
2. Simms v. Simms, 31 Misc. 2d 882, 221 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 16 App. Div. 2d
806 (1961) on the basis of New York Domestic Relations Law § 5(3) (McKinney 1964). It
provides: "A marriage is incestuous and void whether the relatives are legitimate or
illegitimate between either: . . . An uncle and neice or an aunt or nephew."
3. In Re Estate of Simms, 31 App. Div. 2d 644, 296 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1968).
4. In Re Estate of Simms, 26 N.Y.2d 163, 309 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1970).
5. The instant court expressed some doubt that the legislature intended the prohibition of New York Domestic Relations Law § 5(3) (McKinney 1964) to extend to
a marriage between an uncle and neice by the half-blood, but refused to base its decision
upon statutory construction because of the prior annulment decree. For a lower court
decision holding that a marriage between an uncle and neice by the half-blood was void,
See Auldey v. Auldey, 196 App. Div. 103, 187 N.Y.S. 652 (1921).
6. Judge Scileppi filed a dissenting opinion in which Judge Breitel concurred.
7. 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
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it would be recognized as valid in New York. Since the contemplated
marriage was "valid at least in some jurisdiction," he reasoned, "the
contract was not interdicted as an unlawful agreement."
The court made the further determination that the religious solemnization of the marriage in New York and subsequent cohabitation as
husband and wife met the agreement's conditions. In so doing, the
court expressly affirmed a lower court's holding in an earlier case. In
re Saffer's Estate,9 factually similar 10 to the instant case, held that an
invalid marriage between neice and uncle was not a bar to enforcement
of a prenuptial agreement whereby the uncle agreed to provide a legacy
for the prospective wife.
The court also denied any public policy impediments to the enforcement of the contract, noting that the annulment suit required the decedent to pay $50 a week to the petitioner for support."
In declaring the validity of the agreement notwithstanding the prior
decree of annulment, the court of appeals departed without comment
from a distinction historically recognized in marital actions. Traditionally, in determining the legal consequences attendant to the
severance of a marital relationship, the courts have distinguished between those relationships which are held void or voidable and those
that are dissolved through a divorce action. A void marriage, theoretically, never existed. It is invalid without the necessity of a court decree and the marriage may be collaterally attacked in any case in which
the marriage is at issue. When the impediment to marriage is less
severe the marriage is voidable not void, and the relationship is le12
gally valid until avoided in a direct suit between the parties.
Logically there is no distinction in the analysis of the consequences
of a void and an avoided marriage. A void marriage never existed. The
declaration of annulment in a voidable marriage "relates back" and
renders the alliance void from its inception. In either case, the parties
18
are treated as though a marriage never existed.
8. In Re Estate of Simms, 26 N.Y.2d 163, -, 309 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1970).
9. 39 Misc. 2d 691, 241 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 489, 248
N.Y.S.2d 279 (1963).
10. Judge Bergan noted that Saffer differed on the facts from the instant case only
as to the amount of money involved and the length of: time-the parties maintained the
relationship.
11. New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1969) allows the court
discretionary authority to direct support payments to the wife in annulment and declaration of nullity actions.
12. Ross, Ohio Law of Marriage, 14 W. Rrs. L. REv. 724, 737 (1963).
13. Matter of Moncrief, 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923); BUT see Harrison v. State,
22 Md. 486 (1863).
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Unlike an annulment, a divorce action is brought to dissolve an
admittedly valid marriage.' 4 The problem before the instant court
therefore is not encountered in a divorce action-as there is a legally
recognizable marriage upon which to base legal consequence.
Because of the bastardization of issue,' 5 destruction of marital property rights, 16 the adverse effect on the rights of strangers to the marriage,' 7 and the lack of recognition of the relation that actually existed 8
ordinarily accompanying a decree rendering the relation illegal from
the beginning, both legislatures and courts have intervened to alleviate
the consequences of the annulment. Legislative intervention is most
prominently seen in those statutes specifying as causes for divorce impediments that are ordinarily grounds for annulment, 9 laws legitimating the issue of invalid marriages,20 and those statutes permitting
2
alimony payments in annulment actions. '
Similarly, because of the harsh results of a strict application of the
"relation back" doctrine, some courts have developed ameliorating
exceptions causing the results in cases adjudicating the legal consequences attendant to an invalid marriage to lack uniformity. The
question has arisen in a variety of fact situations. Some courts have
held the defective marriage absolutely invalid, 22 while others have
given some legal effect to the unlawful marriage.2 3 The reason for this

absence of consistency and the problem facing the court in such cases
is aptly stated by one textbook writer as follows:
When people behave in a manner inconsistent with their legal
relations, the courts face the difficult issue of choosing between the
law's demands and the parties expectations. In such cases the
is not possible. One interest
reconciliation of law and conduct
24
must be sacrificed to the other.
14. 4 AM. JuR. 2d Annulment of Marriage § 1 (1962).
15. In Re Moncrief, 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923); Cline's Estate 128 Pa. Super.
309, 194 A. 222 (1937).
16. Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920).
17. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929).
18. The weight of authority is that, in the absence of a statute providing otherwise,
alimony will not be granted where the marriage has been annulled. See Annot. 54
A.L.R.2d 1410 (1957).
19.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955).

20.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965); New York Domestic Relations Law § 145
(McKinney 1964).
21. New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
22. In Re Moncrief; 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923); Brunel v. Brunel, 64 N.Y.S.2d
295 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
23. Williams v. State, 175 Misc. 972 (Ct. Cl.), 25 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1941); Sefton v. Sefton,
45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955).
24. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 139 (1968).
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Thus, in some jurisdictions de facto recognition has been given an
invalid marriage by allowing an attempted, but void, remarriage to end
a man's obligation to pay his ex-wife alimony until such time as she
should remarry. 25 Also, an invalid marriage has been held of some
effect in respect to marital rights in property accumulated during the
26
relationship.
The results where contractual rights under antenuptial agreements
preceding defective marriages were at issue have likewise been tempered by the courts by recognizing the reasonable expectations of the
parties. Generally, though, where the enforceability of prenuptial
promises is involved, the courts have been reluctant to find that the
parties contemplated anything less than a legal marriage. 27 However,
in a line of cases beginning in 1897 with Ogden v. McHugh28 the
courts have refused to blindly apply the "relation back" rationale to
invalidate the agreement. In the Ogden case where both parties to the
second invalid marriage were apprised of the fact that the only evidence
of the death of the defendant's first husband was his absence for twelve
years, the Massachusetts Court refused rescision where the terms of the
agreement had been executed. The court reasoned that the putative
husband "took the chance that the former husband was yet alive, and
he was equally responsible with the defendant for all the consequences
to her and himself resulting from the marriage ceremony." 29 Avoiding
the inequites that would result from a strict view of the void marriage,
the court further stated:
It would be unjust, under such circumstances to take from the
defendant what she received in return for acts which were of value
to the other contracting party, which were a detriment to herself,
and which only failed of being complete performance on her part
through the operation of a rule of law which all parties had in
mind, and which they all had good reason to suppose was not applicable ....
80
25. Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954); Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal.
2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955). See also Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 141 (1955).
26. Fung Dai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928). See Note,
The Void and Voidable Marriage: A Study in Judicial Method, 7 STAN. L. Rav. 529
(1955), where the author reviews the judicial treatment of the consequences of an invalid
marriage and suggests a balance of policy approach to determine the legal effect of such
marriages.
27. Rubin v. Joseph, 215 App. Div. 91, 213 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1926). In Re Wombwell's
Settlement [1922] 2 Ch. 298.
28. 167 Mass. 276, 45 N.E. 731 (1897).
29. Ogden v. McHugh, 167 Mass. 276, 45 N.E. 731 (1897).
30. Ia. at 279, 45 N.E. at 732.
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Following this precedent, the New York Court of Appeals permitted
the supposed wife to retain property transferred according to the terms
of an antinuptial agreement. In Chief Justice Cardozo's words:
The decree of annulment destroyed the marriage from the beginning as a source of rights and duties ... but it could not obliterate
the past and make events unreal. For two years and more this
marriage had subsisted; for part of those years, there had been life
together as man and wife. Gains there had been and losses beyond
the process of appraisal. The man had enjoyed the society of a
woman, with the opportunity of offspring, who, if born, would
have been legitimate.31
Like the Massachusetts case, the decision here rested upon a desire to
avoid injustice to the disappointed spouse, for the annulment decree
was based upon the husband's fraud. Cardozo correctly recognized that
an annulment granted to advance the society's interest in determining
marital status should not operate to deprive the innocent party of a
right arising from the relationship. 2
Unlike the cases cited in the two preceding paragraphs, Broadrick
v. Broadrick3 held enforceable a prenuptial agreement to designate the
decedent's second wife as beneficiary of a policy of insurance where
the promisor had a living wife by a prior undissolved marriage. The
court, citing Ogden,34 felt that because of the wife's innocence it could
not interfere and rescind the settlement if it had been executed. But,
as the suit was one for the enforcement of the contract, the court went
further. It said:
It is equally clear that if the contract to substitute [plaintiff] as
beneficiary, being executory, would be contrary to public policy
and therefore unenforceable at law or in equity, if she entered
into it with knowledge that he had a lawful wife in being. But
the fact being established that she is an entirely innocent party, it
would be unjust to take away the rights she acquired in return for
acts of value to the other contracting party.... 85
The exceptions to the general rule that an invalid marriage invalidates
a prenuptial agreement, are clear. The courts have not paid blind
obeisance to a rule that would obliterate totally the legal consequences
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 19,166 N.E. 783, 786 (1929).
Id.
Broadrick v. Broadrick, 25 Pa. Super. 225 (1904).
Ogden v. McHugh, 167 Mass. 276, 45 N.E. 731 (1897).
Broadrick v. Broadrick, 25 Pa. Super. 225, 233 (1904).
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of a void marriage in determining contractual rights. Where there is a
belief in a state of facts as to one's capability to marry 6 or where the
promisor or grantor was at fault in causing the annulment, the innocent party should not be required to forego the benefits of the bargain
made.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case, in distinguishing
the legality of the contract from that of its performance 37 where both
occurred in the same jurisdiction, crystallized an incongruity instigated
by the Saffer decision. Professor George Alexander,38 in commenting
upon the'Safer holding, noted the difficulty of the position taken by
the court in light of other decisions holding a prenuptial agreement
void where premised upon a proposed bigamous marriage. Following
the court's reasoning, the agreement would not be illegal because upon
the death of the first spouse or after obtaining a divorce, it would be
possible to effect a valid marriage.3 9 However, whether the facts are as
Professor Alexander posed or as present in Saffer and the instant case,
the marriage ceremony would be void when contracted.
On the basis of public policy as expressed in section 5(3) of the New
York Domestic Relations Law,40 the decision in the instant case appears to be unsound. The Act condemns equally the classes of marriage
within the specified degrees of consanguinity3' and is premised on a
strong social interest of the state in avoiding the birth of degenerate
issue. In the recently liberalized New York divorce law4 2 the legislature
chose to expand the grounds upon which divorce can be maintained,
leaving incestuous marriage between uncle and neice subject to the
law of annulment. The result here has the unwanted effect of erasing
the distinction between a declaration of nullity and a decree of divorce.
Nor can the result be justified on the basis of the parties' expectations.
36. See concurring opinion in Hosmer v. Tiffany,
Supp. 797, 800 (1906).
37. See Staats v. Staats, 157 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (New
court held an antenuptial agreement made in Nevada
York because of a prior living spouse "even though
agreement is valid in Nevada."

115 App. Div. 303, 306 100 N.Y.
York City Court, 1957), where the
against the public policy of New
it be assumed arguendo that the

38. Alexander, Family Law, 1963 Suryey of N.Y. Law, 15 SYlACUSE L. Rav. 369 (1963).
39. But see Brunel v. Brunel 64 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1946); In re Lieberman 6 Misc.
2d 396, 162 N.Y.S.2d 62, rev'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 512, 167 N.Y.S.2d 158, aff'd, N.Y.2d 719,
177 N.Y.S.2d 707, 152 N.E.2d 665 (1957).
40. New York Domestic Relations Law § 5(3) (McKinney 1964).
-41. New"York Domestic Relations Law § 5(1)-(2) (McKinney 1964) also declares
marriages between "An ancestor and a descendant" and "A brother and sister of either
the whole or the half-blood" to be "incestuous and void." See also New York Domestic
Relations § 6 (McKinney 1964) providing: "A marriage is absolutely void if contracted
by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living...."
42. New York Domestic Relations Law § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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One should not be permitted to benefit from an agreement, the- performance of which is in direct violation of a significant state law,
unless compelling equities 4 intervene to justify such enforcement.
Thomas M. Schultz

TORT-COMMON

CARRIER-DUTY OF CARE-The

Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania has held that a common carrier is not the guardian of its
passengers' financial interests and thus has no duty to secure the name
and license number of individuals involved in traffic accidents with cabs
when the cab driver in no way caused the accident.
Stupka v. Peoples Cab Company, 437 Pa. 509, 260 A.2d 512 (1970).
The plaintiff was a passenger in a taxicab operated by the defendant
when it was struck in the rear by another vehicle. The taxicab was not
moving at the time of the accident and there is no claim that the
accident was, in any way, caused by the actions of the cab driver. It
appears from the facts that, immediately after the accident, the cab
driver approached the driver of the other Vehicle, spoke with him, but
did not secure his name or license number before the unknown driver
left the scene of the accident. Plaintiff's theory was that the taxicab
driver owed her a duty to secure this information, and that his failure
to do so constituted a breach of the duty a carrier owes to its passenger,
and therefore, it should be liable for her injuries since this breach
deprived her of an action against the hit-and-run driver for these injuries.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County held that the carrier owed no duty to the passenger to investigate the facts of the accident so as to aid the passenger in possible future litigation, and
therefore, sustained the defendant's preliminary objection. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.' Justice
43. In Simms v. Simms, 31 Misc. 2d 882, 884, 221 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
16 App. Div. 2d 806 (1961), the annulment decision, the court found that the parties
were aware of the existing relationship. In confronting the defendant's (petitioner in the
instant case) allegation of fraud the court stated that the testator's alleged representations
were ones of law and therefore not sufficient to maintain an action for fraud. However,
the court did admit that the allegations were sufficient to establish a confidential relationship, but the instant court made no mention of this its opinion.
I. Stupka. v. Peoples Cab Company,,437 Pa. 509, 260 A.2d 759 .(1970).
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